7/24/15

Social impact bonds primer

Those who have been following the impact investing sector have probably heard of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs)—otherwise referred to as Pay for Success (PFS) contracts.

PFS is a financing mechanism that brings together funders, payers, and providers to finance and execute on an intervention targeting a specific social outcome. The first SIB/PFS deal was in 2011 in the UK for recidivism reduction—and since then, more have surfaced around the world (e.g. US and Australia) exploring a variety of issue areas (e.g. health, child welfare, education, homelessness).


PFS Stakeholders — Funder, Provider, Payer. Source: PFS Investor Primer

From a funder perspective, PFS contracts present a new set of investable risks—whereby the interpretation and appetite for these risks vary depending on the nature of the investor and the capital base they work with (e.g. philanthropic, blended, investment).

For PFS, much of the experimentation with the first few deals have been seeded using highly risk-tolerant capital, and has mostly served the purposes of demonstrating:
  1. operational (and political) capability, and,
  2. demand-side willingnesses from payers (like government, who see PFS as a risk transfer tool) and providers (non-profits, who see PFS as a scaling tool)
I think that getting PFS to the next stage will require more deliberate attention on the supply-side picture (e.g. funders).

With many of the first PFS deals seeded philanthropically (which has cost of capital of ~0), much of the discussion around risk has been side-stepped. However, better segmentation of risks, and understanding of how these risks link to returns, will need to be the underpinning of any attempt to access/catalyze larger pools of capital needed for the sector to continue to grow/develop/experiment.

To kickstart this discussion, I've put together a high-level document detailing what I see as the key PFS risk factors ("model variables"), and how these link to financial return outcomes relevant for a broader set of funders. This is conceptualized using a basic cashflow valuation model, summarized in this a short primer.

Download here
Pay for Success - Social Impact Bond - Valuation Model / Framework Exerpt. Source: PFS Investor Primer

Thanks to Yale M for technical advice on the topic.

7/23/15

Startups, the macroeconomy, and engines of growth

Lately, I’ve been thinking a lot about whether or not a bubble (or bubble-like behavior) in startups is universally a bad thing once you consider the broader macro situation we're in.

We currently live in a world starved for robust economic growth. And to get growth, you must be willing to invest for it. Since the financial crisis, this is exactly what global monetary policy has been trying to accomplish by (rightly or wrongly) lowering interest rates to near zero levels. The idea is that lower interest rates dis-incentivizes savings, and instead incentivizes investment into higher-risk, higher-returning assets as investors reach for yield. This type of investment today then forms the foundation for tomorrow's growth.

Though, just as not all investments are created equal, the nature of the growth that comes with each may not be either. Investments create the conditions for one of two types of economic growth:

  • Long term growth—which results in new capabilities and efficiencies, new jobs, and has benefits that are broadly distributed across society.
  • Short term growth—which mostly creates value “on paper” and has benefits accruing only to a small group of individuals.

In the past few years, popular risk asset investments have mostly been focused on the short term rather than the long term. We see this manifest most clearly in places like the stock markets where investors have been focused on short term profits—vis-a-vis margin fueled buying and greater fool behavior, while corporates pursue aggressive share repurchases funded by cheap debt. 

Contrast this with startups—where, even though they're risky, they at least have a built-in incentive to focus on the longer term. 

In the best case scenario a startup will fundamentally change the way we think about, or interact with, a core element of our daily lives [1]. They'll introduce new technology (or application of a technology), create new industries and business models, and catalyze changes in workforce capability [2].

In the worst case scenario a startup outright fails and you lose the capital invested (a "fixed" downside). However, one could argue that there is still some long term growth potential from a human capital perspective. The startup's employees still walk away with first-hand experience in working with users and customers, pragmatic risk-taking, and hypothesis-driven experimentation.

We often discount the value of this "startup toolkit" and it's fungibility across all parts of the economy. If these individuals end up later working for a large corporation, the government, or a non-profit, the attitude and skills they bring can only help to energize traditional institutions to think more about longer term value creation.

So to the question posed at the beginning—is it a bad thing that we have bubble (or bubble-like behavior) in startups? In the grand scheme of things, I’d say probably not. Absent of timely investment alternatives elsewhere, we need every engine of long term growth we can get.

Notes:
[1] Examples could range from visible consumer tech companies (like Facebook) to other less talked about startup themes spanning clean energy, agriculture, social impact, etc.

[2] Concrete examples in the latest iteration of the startup ecosystem would be growing interest in things like coding classes, coding boot camps,  data science courses, growth marketing courses, etc.

Thanks to Trevor for reading versions of this.